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Abstract— Authentication and revocation of users in 
Vehicular Adhoc Networks (VANETS) are two vital security 
aspects. It is extremely important to perform these actions  
promptly and efficiently. The past works addressing these 
issues lack in mitigating the reliance on the centralized 
trusted authority and therefore do not provide distributed 
and decentralized security. This paper proposes a blockchain 
based authentication and revocation framework for 
vehicular networks, which not only reduces the computation 
and communication overhead by mitigating dependency on a 
trusted authority for identity verification, but also speedily 
updates the status of revocated vehicles in the shared 
blockchain ledger. In the proposed framework, vehicles 
obtain their Pseudo IDs from the Certificate Authority (CA), 
which are stored along with their certificate in the 
immutable authentication blockchain and the pointer 
corresponding to the entry in blockchain, enables the Road 
Side Units (RSUs) to verify the identity of a vehicle on road. 
The efficiency and performance of the framework has been 
validated using the Omnet++ simulation environment. 
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I. INTRODUCTION  
Privacy and security in Vehicular Ad Hoc Networks 
(VANETs) have gained huge prominence after Vehicle 
Safety Communication (VSC) project [1], delivering the 
concept of pseudonym certificates for vehicles and 
effectively safeguarding the communication within the 
network for a comfortable and safe driving experience. 
The self-structured technology entails Vehicle to roadside 
Infrastructure (V2I) and Vehicle-to-Vehicle (V2V) 
wireless communication using Dedicated Short-Range 
Communication (DSRC) of 5.9 GHz band, with a 
bandwidth of 75 MHz and an approximate range of 
1000m [2]. The cloud servers deployed in the 
conventional centralized mechanism in VANETs serve as 
an excellent bait for the attackers as a single point of 
failure leading to certain treacherous situations and 
disrupting the entire network. In addition, the malicious 
messages from suspicious parties or alteration in genuine 
messages influence the driver's behaviour and can cause 
mishaps jeopardizing the safety of passengers on road. 
Lack of privacy and security breaches, for instance, 
tracking of a vehicle, impose a restriction on using them 
for providing personalized services. 
The next-generation immutable blockchain technology 
made its appearance in 2008 along with the 
cryptocurrency-Bitcoin [3], effectively securing and 
decentralizing the way data is managed and stored, 
thereby, reducing the role of the middleman or a third 
party. The cryptographically sealed and consensus-based 
blockchain architecture uses the concept of a 
synchronized distributed public ledger, a copy of which 
abides in all the nodes and the blocks of the ledger are 
encrypted and chained together in a chronological order. 
A pair of a public and private key is associated with each 
node of the network. A block, which is the basic building 
unit of the chain, encompasses the transactions, its hash 
value, timestamp, a signature of the block and nonce. A 
transaction is signed with a private key of the sender and 
public key of the receiver. Miners are special nodes of the 
network, which compute a complex puzzle [3] to include 
the block into the chain within a specified time and are 
incentivized for the same.  
Though most of the researches in VANETS focusing 
majorly on the security aspect have predominantly 
addressed authentication and conditional privacy issues, 
but they lack to suffice the scalability, efficient 
authentication, quick check on revocation and reducing 
dependency on the centralized authority. In proposed 
work, users associate with the CA only in the registration 
step, post which, on-road authentication, verification, and 
revocation of vehicles is performed by the RSUs using  the 
shared blockchain ledger. Security requirements with user 
anonymity are fulfilled by the shared ledger, which 
reduces the steps in authentication and performing secure 
communication. 
The paper is organized as follows: Section II presents 
the related work, Section III elucidates research 
motivation. In section IV, the proposed framework is 
given. Section V details the implementation and results 
followed by section VI and VII, which focus on 
theoretical analysis and conclusion respectively. 
II. RELATED WORKS 
The open access environment catered by VANETs 
instigates open challenges in the field of privacy and 
security making it unfit for implementation in the real 
world [4-8]. In a study, pre-shared keys were introduced 
to implement the authentication of nodes in the network 
[9]. Calandriello et al. [10] focused on security and 
privacy in VANETs and proposed a hybrid method, which 
strengthens the framework using pseudonyms with self-
certification, thus, eliminating the need for managing 
them without compromising on the robustness of the 
system. To obtain high accuracy and privacy with respect 
to the vehicle's location, Memon et al. [11] developed a 
methodology based on dynamic pseudonym generation 
for mix-zones environment and verified the results using 
the SUMO simulator. 
With the launch of Bitcoin blockchain [12] in 2008, 
the focus of industry and academia shifted towards 
approaches which could secure the way centralized 
networks operated [13]. From then on, some researches in 
VANETs focused on methodologies to improve 
efficiency, guaranteeing privacy and security using the 
blockchain technology. Yuan et al. [14] introduced a 
seven-layer secure and decentralized conceptual model for 
Intelligent Transport System (ITS), discussing the 
relationship between Blockchain-based ITS and parallel 
transportation management systems claiming the former 
to be the future of ITS. After the introduction of 
autonomous/self-driving vehicles on the road for which 
efficient and timely communication amongst the nodes is 
of utmost importance, Rowan et al. [15] explored the use 
of sensing and signalling devices using blockchain public 
key infrastructure and an inter-vehicle session key 
establishment protocol. The decentralized framework 
proposed in this paper is claimed to be secure and 
trustable, thus providing reduced CA dependency, 
authentication with minimal overheads and 
communication with validation check. 
III. RESEARCH MOTIVATION 
When vehicles begin their travel on road, the 
infrastructure should uphold the monumental purpose of 
user safety and security for administering and provisioning 
these services. Authentication and authorisation of network 
users with reduced latency is the most essential part, 
considering the dynamic nature of the network. Keeping 
all these scenarios into consideration, we have derived our 
problem statement, which is broadly categorized into the 
following requirements. 
Mutual Authentication with Reduced Dependency on CA: 
Mutual authentication between OBU and RSU should not 
involve complex computations or frequent 
communications with the CA unlike some earlier schemes 
[17]. 
Scalability: The framework should reckon with scalable 
attributes to the vastness of vehicular networks. 
Privacy Protection: The authentication of users should not 
incur at the cost of their identity disclosure or perturbing 
their privacy.  
Message Confidentiality, Integrity and Non-Repudiation: 
The security mechanism should verify authenticity and 
integrity and prevent unauthorized access by intruders, to 
avoid any compromise of confidentiality and 
authentication to prevent repudiation.  
Speedy Revocation Without Additional Overhead: The 
framework should not just be able to perform 
authentication, but quickly revocate the malicious 
vehicles. The vehicles revocated should be easy to 
identify without circulating an entire Certificate 
Revocation List (CRL) as it causes lot of overhead. 
The novel blockchain-based framework proposed in 
this paper ensures privacy and security of vehicles in the 
decentralized network. Here, a private blockchain is used 
which gives selective access to ledger, where Revocation 
Authority (RA) and CA have complete control over the 
ledger, giving RSUs only read rights, and no rights to 
OBUs, hence avoiding any exposure to untrusted entities. 
The hash table and pointer to the ledger entry, which 
reside with the CA support traceability of vehicles, in case 
of any suspicious behaviour. This framework makes use 
of no POW (Proof-of-Work) [3] mechanism, hence, 
reducing the computational costs. We have used the 
Proof-of-authority [16], whereby access rights are issued 
based on predefined authority. The framework eliminates 
the need of any CRL and makes it easy with a quick step 
to discover a node’s revocation. 
IV. PROPOSED FRAMEWORK 
This section presents functioning of the proposed 
framework, which is unique due to the introduction of a 
private blockchain in authentication and revocation. This 
blockchain mainly contributes in the operation of the 
framework by reducing dependency on the CA.  
A. Fundamental Operation of the Framework 
The notations used in the proposed framework are 
given in Table 1. The physical entities, i.e. CA, RA, and 
RSU collaboratively communicate via the shared ledger to 
achieve the security for ‘safety-on-road’ motive which is 
explained in the following three phases briefly.  
TABLE I.  NOTATIONS 
Notation Meaning 
→ Unicast communication  
--)) Broadcast Communication 
# An entity stores the data in the data structure following 
it.  
* An entity operates on the data structure/object 
following it.  
H () Hash function 
{} DSX Digitally signed by X 
EX () Encrypt with X 
DX () Decrypt with X 
Verify () Function to check integrity and authenticity of a 
message. 
Mi Message 
Group () Function to include a vehicle in the group after 
authentication 
Query () Function to search Pseudo ID of the OBU in β 
Β Authentication and revocation ledger  
Ptri Pointer to the ledger entry 
HPrevj Previous hash of the block 
SRSUi Private key of i
th RSU 
Txi i
th transaction of block X in the ledger  
TIDBi Transaction ID of i
th transaction of block B, given as 
H(input transaction) 
MAP () Mapping function 
Vi i
th vehicle 
B. System  Initialization 
The framework focuses on reducing dependency on 
the CA but does not completely deny its importance in the 
dynamic vehicular networks. During system initialization, 
different participants prepare to be occupied with 
numerous domain parameters required for later security 
operations. The CA builds the system for the ECC based 
PKI, by establishing the system parameters X=p, a, b, G, 
n and h for the curve Cp in the field Fp.  Here, integer p 
defines the field Fp, a and b are constants defining the 
curve equation, G is the generator of the cyclic group Zp, n 
which determines the order of G, is a prime number and h 
is the curve’s cofactor given by h= (1/n) |C(Fp). These 
parameters along with the publicly known hashing 
functions are stored in the vehicles during registration. In 
addition, the RSUs are supplied with the CA’s public key 
for signature verification in the ledger. CA generates its 
public key with its private key given by PCA= x. G, where 
x is the private key of CA. 
The blockchain network among the CA, RA and RSUs 
is setup by their public keys, through which they address 
and verify each other while storing and retrieving 
transactions. The genesis block for the authentication and 
revocation ledger is securely generated. Here, the CA 
creates new Identities, just as new coins are generated in 
the bitcoin blockchain. Apart from these, vehicles are 
assumed to obtain their Vehicles’ ID before registration 
from the Motor Vehicle’s Division (MVD). 
C. Registration of the Vehicle 
The users register with the CA for the first time by 
submitting their VID obtained from the MVD. The CA 
verifies the VIDi, assigns a Pseudo ID (PIDi) and 
generates an ECC Public-Private key pair namely Pki and 
Ski. The mapping of the actual identity with the assigned 
PIDi is stored in a hash map in its database. This ensures 
easy lookup in case of traceability and revocation of 
malicious users. The PIDi issued is digitally signed by the 
CA and forms a transaction of the Block β in the ledger. 
 
TABLE II.  REGISTRATION OF THE VEHICLE VI WITH CA 
1. Vi → CA:    ⟨VIDi, Other Details⟩ 
2. CA*VIDi:    ⟨Verify (VIDi)⟩ 
3. CA # TBi:     ⟨input→ (PIDi)DSCA⟩ 
                                ⟨output 1→ (OP_Return “H(CertPIDi”)) 
                                ⟨output 2→ Script: Verify (H(PKRA), SigRA)) 
                                                    Value: val0) 
4. CA # β:       Update Ledger with the transaction 
5. CA → Vi:    ⟨PIDi, Certificate (PIDi, DSCA), ECC (Pki, Ski),  
                                TIDBi Hash_pointerB, H_PrevB⟩                                
6.  CA # Hashmap:  ⟨MAP (PIDi||VIDi⟩ 
 
The input of the transaction can be easily verified as it 
includes CA’s public key hash address and its ECDSA 
signature. The output of the transaction is the most 
important part for identity verification. There are two 
outputs corresponding to each input for a new vehicle 
registration. The first output is the hash value of the 
certificate Certi embedded in the OP_Return instruction of 
the output script. For an output script without an 
OP_return, the output is redeemed with the public-key-
hash of the recipient and a signature verification called as 
‘Pay-to-pubkeyhash’ [3]. The transaction redeeming this 
output needs to provide an appropriate hash value, 
generated using its public key and signed using the 
corresponding private key. Thus, for redemption, the 
output script should evaluate to true with the above 
conditions satisfied and the output being an unused 
transaction output (UTXO). However, an output script 
containing the OP_return has no amount to be redeemed 
and thus the output script evaluates to be false. This 
output is only used to verify the authenticity of the 
certificate by matching it with the one sent by the OBU. 
The second output assigns a small amount of 0.02$ to the 
RA, which is redeemed by the RA in case of the vehicle 
going rogue and thus setting up the ‘revocation flag’ in 
the revocation transaction, thus, redeeming this amount. 
Post creation of the transaction, SHA-256 hashing 
function is used to compute the block’s cryptographic 
hash as HOBβi = H (TBi, HPrevj) and the ledger is updated. 
The result forms the hash previous for the next block, 
which is uploaded to Ledger β shared among the CA, RA 
and RSUs. 
Conforming to the bitcoin transactions, these are also 
added by the CA in the chronological order and there is no 
serial number. Each transaction has a transaction Id (TID) 
that unlike the bitcoin transactions is just the hash of the 
input transaction, digitally signed by the CA. This ensures 
its verification. The steps of registration are depicted in 
Table 2. 
However, since this is a private blockchain with no 
proof of work, with a layer of access control on the top of 
the shared ledger and a few positive assumptions, 
transactions can be modified in an extreme case. The CA 
then returns Hash_pointerB, assigned PIDi with 
corresponding certificate, and TIDBi to the OBU. The ECC 
key-pair (Pk and Sk) are stored in the OBU’s TPM.  
D. Mutual Identity Authentication and Revocation 
When the OBU is active on the road, it authenticates 
itself with the RSU and becomes part of the group of 
vehicles in range of the RSU as shown in Fig 1. The 
identity Ri of the RSU, obtained from the CA, serves both 
as its Identity as well its Public key. When the OBU 
comes in the range of the first RSU on road, it is notified 
from the OBU, since it contains all requisite identity 
information and certificates of the nearest RSUs stored in 
it. The OBU forms a message M containing its 
Hash_pointerB, TIDBi and Ptri, which is encrypted with Ri 
using IBE scheme as shown in table 3. 
The RSU upon receiving the message decrypts it with 
its private key SRSU, and gets the PIDi, corresponding 
ledger entry and pointer to the block. It queries the 
blockchain using the PIDi as the index and when found, 
verifies both the outputs for the respective transaction. 
Once confirmed, the RSU sends a challenge integer (say 
‘n’) to the OBU encrypted with its public key and waits 
for the response. If the OBU could decrypt the challenge 
message and send response as the next positive integer 
(‘n+1’), it is authenticated by the RSU. The OBU is 
provided with the corresponding group key. Now, post 
 
 
authentication, the new vehicle becomes part of the group 
of vehicles in the range of the RSU and is hence 
authorized to request any data, send information 
accumulated from the surroundings or receive emergency 
alerts from the RSU.  
Figure 1.  Mutual Authentication of OBU-RSU 
Figure 2. Revocation of malicious vehicle 
 
 
TABLE III.  MUTUAL IDENTITY AUTHENTICATION: OBUS FIRST   
ENCOUNTER WITH A RSU OR CHANGING RSU 
 
 1.  OBUi*Mi:            ⟨PIDi, CertPIDi, ERi (Hash_PointerB || TIDBi) ⟩ 
 2.  OBUi → RSUi:    ⟨Mi⟩ 
 3.  RSUi*Mi:              ⟨D SRSUi (Hash_PointerB || TIDBi) ⟩ 
 4.  RSUi*β:                ⟨Query(β||PIDi) ⟩ 
 5.  RSU*TXi:                        Verify(H(Certi) stored = H(Certi) received)) 
                                    val0 → not redeemed and Revocation Flag = 
False,  
                                     if true go to step 6, else, do not authenticate.                          
 
 6.  RSU* Certi :                ⟨Extract Pki⟩ 
 7.  RSUi → OBUi:       ⟨EPki (Challenge integer N) ⟩ 
 8.  OBU*(Challenge): ⟨DPki (Challenge integer N) ⟩ 
 9.  OBUi → RSUi:        ⟨EPki (Challenge-Response Integer N+1) ⟩ 
 10.  RSUi → OBUi:      ⟨Group(OBUi)⟩ 
  
For revocation, suppose the RSU receives a message 
from a malicious node and the message content is proven 
fallacious, then in such a scenario, the RSU would 
communicate with the RA sending the ‘bogus message’ as 
well as the PIDi responsible (Table 4). This transaction 
corresponding to the PIDi is verified by the RA and for 
initiating revocation of this PIDi, RA creates a new 
‘revocation transaction’ taking the current PIDi registration 
transaction as the input transaction and redeeming the 
0.02$ in its output, thus setting the revocation flag = true. 
The original transaction is only verified without updating, 
and a new revocation transaction is generated, so that, 
when the malicious vehicle tries communication with the 
RSU, it can be identified through the revocation flag. In 
addition, the immutable nature of the ledger is not 
tampered. Also, the Hash map is updated accordingly by 
the CA. Now, RSUs instead of looking for a CRL can now 
easily verify the status by a transaction as shown in Fig 2. 
 
TABLE IV.  REVOCATION OF MALICIOUS VEHICLE 
1.  Vi → RSUi:       ⟨” Bogus Message” ⟩ 
2.  RSU→RA:        ⟨EPKRA (PIDi||’Bogus Message’) ⟩     
3.  RA # TDj:                 ⟨input→ (PIDi || H (CertPIDi) || (val0)) DSRA⟩ 
                  ⟨output 1→ (OP_Return “H (CertPIDi)”, 
                   Revocation  Flag = True”)) ⟩ 
4.  RA # β:              ⟨Update Ledger with the Revocation transaction⟩ 
5. CA #HashMap:  ⟨ Search Revoked PID and delete entry⟩  
 
For an emergency scenario detection, we assume RSUs 
to form a Mesh Network and hence easy connectivity and 
reachability is attained. Upon detection of an event, the 
OBU forms a message, which is verified by the RSU and 
forwarded either to the group of vehicles in range or to 
RSU of the respective area using an appropriate routing 
protocol. This avoids network flooding with the broadcast 
messages. Also, as the vehicles are authenticated by the 
RSU and are part of a group, RSU maintains a group table 
after authentication, to elude repeated ledger check for 
these vehicles. 
V. IMPLEMENTATION AND RESULTS 
A. System Setup 
To demonstrate functionality of the proposed protocol, 
we have used the Veins [18] framework, which supports a 
range of models to display both the road traffic and 
network simulation. For network simulation we have used 
OMNeT++ 4.6 (Objective Modular Network Testbed in 
C++), which is a discrete event simulator.  
 
TABLE V.  SIMULATION PARAMETERS 
 
Simulation Parameter Value 
Simulation time 6000s 
Frequency 5.9 GHz 
Number of nodes 1-100 
Size of ground 5000m 
Packet size 100-200 bytes 
PHY Layer IEEE 802.11P 
MAC Layer IEEE 1609.4 
Data Rate 18Mbps 
Measured parameters Delay, Throughput and packet delivery 
ration (PDR) 
 
To prototype intermodal traffic systems, SUMO-0.19.0 
(Simulation of Urban Mobility) framework is used as the 
mobility generator to test and optimize the potent and 
efficiency of the proposed framework. The simulation is 
run on a Windows 7 (ultimate -x86) operating system with 
8 GB of RAM. The simulation parameters are listed in 
Table 5. 
The vehicles in the sumo simulator are shown as the 
dynamic nodes in the Omnet framework, where we code 
their functionality and behavior while in movement 
utilizing the inbuilt libraries and procedures. For our 
testing, the number of vehicles range from 1- 50, with 
speeds ranging from 14 to 20 m/s. The parameters 
associated with delay, throughput and PDR have been 
considered to showcase how the protocol performs, and 
the average values over an interval of every 5 vehicles is 
gathered. 
The scenario consists of two RSUs located on road and 
authenticating vehicles by means of the shared ledger. The 
above-discussed parameters are evaluated for assessing 
the performance as they could successfully depict how 
addition of a few fields in the message communication, 
and encryption and decryption of messages affected the 
original working. Detailed analysis of the results under 
these parameters and the mentioned simulation setup are 
examined in the following subsection. 
B. Performance Analysis 
The protocol performs comparatively well considering 
the time taken with and without addition of security 
features. The difference in performance occurs due to the 
time consumption in executing the security operations, 
thus establishing the security requirements. The proposed 
protocol has been analyzed based on three parameters i.e. 
delay, throughput, and packet delivery ratio (PDR) with 
unicast communications between the vehicles and RSUs. 
The graphs show the comparison of the framework before 
and after applying the security features of encryption, 
decryption, verification and authorization for successful 
authentication and access control. The delay at RSUs 
increases with the increasing number of vehicles due to 
the time taken by encryption, decryption and ledger 
verification for upholding identity and confirming 
revocation simultaneously. 
C. End-to-End Delay and Throughput 
End-to-end delay between the OBUs and RSUs is the most 
important factor in assessing the performance as it 
evidently depicts how an additional overhead of 
encryption and decryption increases the delay in 
processing and response from the receiving RSU. We 
have only considered the computation delay, which is, the 
time consumed by RSU to decrypt the received message, 
get the pointer information and PID from the 
corresponding transaction and generate the challenge 
message, with encryption using the public key of the PID. 
The communication delay, which totally depends on the 
increasing number of vehicles, is also shown in Fig. 3. We 










increases linearly with nodes advancing from 5 to 10. 
However, witnessing the nature of the two graphs, 
considering the minimal amount of time in the ECC 
encryption and decryption, signature generation and 
verification, querying the ledger, and verifying the 
outputs, the delay is admissible, with the amount of 
security it acheives.  Thus, we conclude that the slight 
variation in the two graphs is attributable to these 
additional steps as depicted in the Fig 4. 
 
D. Packet-Delivery Ratio(PDR) 
PDR defines the number of packets successfully 
delivered over the gross packets transmitted. The graph in 
Fig. 5 shows the comparison of how many packets are 
delivered successfully before and after application of the 
framework. The PDR values before encryption shows a 
linear rise between 90% and 96% with 35 vehicles and 
further increasing to 98% as number of vehicles move 
from 35 to 50 vehicles. With our proposed security 
framework, it is evident from the graph that up to 35 
vehicles it is constant at 95%, which starts to drop with 
increasing traffic on road from 35 to 50 vehicles. 
VI. THEORITICAL ANALYSIS 
RSU uses Diffie-Hellman key-agreement protocol for 
key establishment [19], whereas in this paper, TA issues 
public private key-pair for vehicles using ECC, along with 
IBE scheme for key establishment. The OBU when enters 
the vicinity of a new RSU, sends a message to the RSU 
which is encrypted with the OBU's private key and is then 
decrypted by the RSU using the former's public key in 
[19].  Whereas, in the proposed framework, the PID of 
vehicle, the transaction id and the block pointer are 
encrypted with the RSU's identity for authentication and 
the private key of the RSU is further used to decrypt and 
fetch the contents of the message. The proposed algorithm 
implements traceability using the concept of hash map 
and pointer to the ledger and revocation by taking the 
authenticated transaction as the input and spending the 
received amount, which sets the revocation flag in the 
revocation transaction to be true. The CA updates the 
status as revocated in the hash map. In [19], authors use a 
group table for traceability but do not implement 
revocation. It utilizes the concept of secret keys for 
message forwarding within the group and hops for 
communication between the groups. In [19], more time is 
consumed when the revocation list grows larger. 
Issue of the key-pair by the CA and storing the 
corresponding PIDi and certificate on the blockchain, 
assures two things, firstly, when the vehicle 
communicates with the RSU with these credentials, by 
  
 
Figure 3. End-to-end delay performance  Figure 4. Throughput with increasing vehicles Figure 5.  PDR with increasing vehicles 
 
confirming with the matching transaction on the 
blockchain RSU knows they have not been tampered. 
Second, it ensures that the vehicles have not been 
revocated. 
A. Security Analysis 
Our security analysis is based on the following claims 
where we argue that, justifications to our claims are 
validated by experimental results obtained through 
simulation. 
Claim-1: Proposed method reduces the dependency on CA 
thereby reducing the communication overhead in vehicle 
authentication. 
Proof: Unlike traditional methods, whereby the RSU 
communicates with the CA for identity or pseudonym 
verification for every communication, in our case we have 
eliminated that dependency by introducing a shared 
ledger. The dependency on the CA exists, but only for 
initial System parameters, key generation and distribution. 
Unlike traditional methods, the communication overhead 
is reduced with ‘no certificates’ in communication. 
Claim-2: An impersonation attack cannot be launched by 
an internal or external attacker.  
Proof: Our protocol is secured against any impersonation 
attack, which in turn prevents data tampering of the 
packets and thus provides integrity of data packets. Since 
we are using the ECC cryptography, to gain access to user 
keys, he must be able to solve the ECDLP as discussed in 
section III.D, which is computationally hard enough to 
make the system secure. Firstly, an external attacker 
cannot have block pointer details for authentication and 
second, the ledger is cryptographically secure. 
Claim-3: There is no single point of failure for the actual 
user data. 
Proof: Considering that, each of the CA, RA and RSUs 
maintain a copy of the authentication and revocation 
ledger; if one of them loses these copies, then they are 
easily recovered. The RSUs due to storage crunch might 
not contain the complete copy at any single time but can 
access the ledger if required.  
VII. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE DIRECTIONS  
This paper presents a novel and efficient technique of 
mutual authentication in the VANET environment. The 
framework not only just authenticates vehicles with 
reduced dependency on the trusted third party but, also 
preserves their anonymity without revealing the original 
identity of users. Despite reducing the communication 
overhead, the framework serves to achieve statutory 
security requirements. It eliminates the need to circulate 
CRLs by the CA or RSUs, and instead mends the status of 
a vehicle’s revocation flag to be true. In future, we would 
like to decentralize the VANET environment by further 
exploring the characteristics of the blockchain technology. 
We aim to use smart contracts particularly and aim to deal 
with an emergency scenario, which automatically either 
updates the ledger for nearby RSUs or sends an alarm to 
the nearby vehicles depending on the entries of 
authenticated vehicle database. 
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